LEXIS COUNSEL CONNECT is a communications and information service for attorneys. LCC is managed by American Lawyer Media, L.P.
[G.J.]
[Editor's Note: Pages 229-232, all of Section G, were omitted from the copy provided to LCC and circulated in-house at the Department of Justice by DOJ editors. We have reprinted the table of contents as an outline of the material covered in that Section.]
IV. SPECIFIC ISSUES INVESTIGATED
G. FBI Internal Review of HRT Shots Taken on August 22, 1992 229
1. Introduction 229
2. Statement of Facts 229
3. Discussion 230
4. Conclusion 232
Released through
LEXIS COUNSEL CONNECT
LEXIS COUNSEL CONNECT is a communications and information service for attorneys. LCC is managed by American Lawyer Media, L.P.
The investigation of the events at Ruby Ridge from August 21-August 31, 1992, included several searches and attempts to gather evidence. There were three primary crime scenes and search areas. The first crime scene was at the intersection of two old logging roads known as the "Y"; the second was the weaver cabin; and the third was the area around the cabin, including out buildings such as the birthing shed. During the searches of the crime scenes, a wide variety of objects was retrieved for use as evidence in the Weaver prosecution.
This section will address various allegations of errors, omissions, and misconduct relating to the crime scene searches. There have been allegations that the measurements taken during the searches were inaccurate; that the FBI staged or planted evidence; that the personnel, techniques, and equipment employed in the searches were inadequate because they lacked the requisite competence or technical efficiency; that third parties were allowed to infect the crime scene to cover up the government's wrongful conduct; and that the integrity of the crime scenes was not maintained.
The FBI conducted searches of the Y area on August 24, August 27-31 and September 1, 1992. The FBI supervised searches of the Weaver cabin, grounds, and outbuildings on August 31 and September 1 and September 10, 1992. An additional search of the Y and the Weaver cabin and grounds was conducted on March 22 and March 23, 1993. The search teams consisted primarily of FBI personnel from the Salt Lake City and Seattle Divisions and the FBI Laboratory, augmented by personnel from the U.S. Marshals Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, tobacco and Firearms, the Idaho Bureau of Investigation, and the Boundary County Sheriff's Office.
Special Agent in Charge Eugene Glenn maintained overall control and authorized all investigative activities relating to the crime scenes and evidentiary matters. T. Michael Dillon, Senior Supervisory Resident Agent of the FBI's Boise office, had overall supervisory responsibilities over the FBI's searches of the 'Y' and the Weaver cabin, grounds and outbuildings and acted as the search supervisor at the Weaver cabin.
Two FBI special agents were assigned significant roles in carrying out the crime scene searches. Joseph Venkus was responsible for developing procedures and instructions for the searches and establishing a chain of custody for seized evidence. He was also responsible for organizing the search teams and handing out assignments. Venkus directed the initial search of the Y and acted in various capacities during the search of the Weaver cabin. Gregory Rampton was responsible for coordinating interviews of the marshals involved in the shooting incident at the Y on August 21 and for preparing affidavits for search warrants. Rampton also acted as a team leader during the search of the Weaver cabin.
Other FBI agents played significant roles in the crime scene investigation. Special Agent Larry Wages was assigned search responsibilities during the initial search of the Y and directed the later searches of the Y. Wages also participated in the search of the grounds surrounding the Weaver cabin. Special Agent George Sinclair was team leader for the exterior search of the grounds and outbuildings near the Weaver cabin.
The Strategic Information and Operations Center Log ("SIOC") at FBI Headquarters asserts that a specialized Evidence Response Team was available as early as August 22 to conduct and coordinate the retrieval of evidence at the Ruby Ridge crime scene. [FN914] Glenn was not aware that the Evidence Response Team was available, but he state that he would not have used the team in any case because he saw Ruby Ridge as a 'normal murder crime scene" and believed that the complexity of the crime scene would not become an issue. [FN915]
On March 22-23, 1993, another search of the Y area was conducted, although there were between six inches and two feet of snow on the ground. Assistant U.S. Attorney Lindquist, Rampton, Boundary County Idaho Deputy Sheriffs, and several U.S. Deputy Marshal were present, as well as two individual Lindquist had retained: Lucien Haag, a criminologist who was reconstructing the August 21 shooting at the Y and Richard Graham, a retired FBI agent who specialized in the use of metal detectors. [FN916] The partial butt plate of Sammy Weaver's weapon was discovered using Graham's metal detector. [FN917]
During the crisis, seven searches of the Y crime scene were conducted on August 24 and August 27-31, and September 1, 1992. Aside from the September search, the searches were conducted while the situation at Ruby Ridge was unresolved. Because Weaver and Harris were still in the cabin farther up the mountain, FBI supervisors were concerned about the security of the personnel who would conduct the searches. The Marshals Service and FBI SWAT teams provided security for those who conducted the crime scene searches, and the marshals first mad certain that there were no booby traps or unauthorized persons in the area. [FN918]
The Weaver cabin could be reached in two ways: by a dirt road, which the weavers generally used, and by two old logging roads that formed the Y below the cabin. During the crisis and until the surrender of the Weaver group, the road beneath the cabin was considered too dangerous; the road through the Y crime scene was determined to be the safer way for access to HRT Command Post personnel and monitoring sites. Therefore, during the crisis, HRT Command Post personnel and equipment used the road that passed through the Y crime scene.
On Sunday, August 23, Dillon conducted a two-hour meeting with the agents who ere to participate in the searches. [FN919] Venkus presented a detailed organizational plan and organized tow separate search teams to search the Y and the Weaver cabin. [FN920] Dillon arranged to obtain metal detectors to use during the searches. [FN921]
For the Y crime scene search of August 24, Venkus developed an operational plan, providing specific assignments for spotters, a lead agent to collect evidence, a photographer, a video camera operator, and someone to sketch the crime scene and note the location of evidence. The Marshal Service, at Dillon's request, established a perimeter and provided security during the searches at the Y through September 1. [FN922]
Venkus' operational plan included instructions establishing a chain of custody for evidence, governing the search and the recovery, documentation, and security of evidence found. Venkus established a tree stump as the reference point for making measurements to establish and memorialize the location of evidence. In order to find any evidence, he instructed a line of agents, on each side of the road at arm's length, to proceed across the crime scene. [FN923]
The area around the Y was very dense, and searches were difficult. Agents had to rake through three to six inches of leaves and branches to locate cartridge casings and other pieces of evidence. FBI agents and representatives of the Boundary County Sheriff's Office used metal detectors to locate evidence. [FN924]
As evidence was located, an index card or small flag was placed where the evidence was found. Venkus would observe the distance from the reference point to the spot where the evidence was found. The measurement would be recorded on the crime scene sketch that Thundercloud prepared. Evidence was photographed and assigned a letter designation. [FN925] Venkus retrieved the evidence and placed it in a plastic evidence bag with an index card noting the letter and number designation of the evidence. After the search was completed, Dillon held a meeting with the participants to discuss what they found. [FN926]
Special Agent Larry Wages was placed in charge of crime scene searches at the Y as of August 28, 1992. Venkus and Dillon instructed him to follow the procedure that Venkus had established for searches. Dillon continued to hold meetings before and after each search to ensure that all participants understood their assignments and to discuss what had been found. [FN927]
Wages cordoned off the Y crime scene into approximately 10- foot grids for the August 28 search. For each grid, Wages assigned a team of two agents, one to operate a metal detector and the other to act as a spotter. After completing the search of a grid, the team would repeat the process. The procedures Venkus established for the chain of custody of the evidence were followed, including the sighting, documentation, and recovery of evidence. At the conclusion of the search, Wages turned over all the evidence found to Venkus for storage and submission to the FBI Laboratory. [FN928]
Later, under Rampton's direction, the fern field was searched with metal detectors for spent rounds or markings in the area where the marshals reported receiving gunfire form trees overhead. No rounds or markings were discovered. [FN929]
Commencing on August 28, the five marshals, who participated in the events surrounding the shooting of Deputy Marshal Degan at the Y on August 21, were taken on individual walk-throughs of the crime scene so that the investigating agents could obtain a clearer understanding of the shooting location and the chain of events.
During the FBI supervised searches of the Y area and the vicinity of the Weaver residence, the location of evidence was noted in relation to fixed reference point and in relation to the other objects of evidence found. [FN930] As evidence was locate, Agent Thundercloud made a sketch or diagram of the location of the objects in relation to the fixed point. The sketch was made by hand and was not drawn to scale. [FN931]
(1) Triangulation Not Utilized
Triangulation is a technique commonly used to memorialize the location of evidence discovered at crime scenes by measuring the location from two fixed reference points to ensure that the exact location of the evidence is pinpointed. Triangulation was not utilized during the recovery of evidence at Ruby Ridge. The FBI's failure to triangulate was harshly criticized by the other members of the trial team and by the defense at trial.
The FBI's primary explanation for not using triangulation was that the uneven terrain made it impractical. Venkus believed that triangulation was not only impractical in this case, it was "ludicrous." [FN932] One of the other explanations given by the FBI for its failure to triangulate is that Assistant U.S. Attorney Howen may have told Wages that triangulation was not necessary and that he should "just get a compass direction and distance from the tree trunk." [FN933] Howen does not recall discussing triangulation, but does recall discussing the possibility of locating evidence through compass headings. [FN934] Assistant U.S. Attorney Lindquist believes that triangulation should be used at crime scene investigations, unless there is a clear reason not to do so. [FN935]
(2) The "Magic" Bullet
During the search of the Y crime scene on August 31, the FBI photographer Kelly Kramer was not available at the start of the search to take photographs of the evidence located and to assign letter designations to it. Furthermore, agents discovered that some of the flags marking the location of evidence had been walked on or moved as vehicles went through the area. [FN936]
Considerable interest has been generated about an intact bullet Wages discovered at the center of the Y during this search. This bullet was designated "L-1" and was referred to by defense counsel as the "magic bullet." Wages could not understand why the bullet had not been discovered during the previous searches. The bullet was not "pristine"; it had been fired from a weapon and had a dent and striations on it. Later, it was determined that the bullet had been fired from one of the Ruger weapons found in the Weaver cabin after the Weaver/Harris group surrendered. [FN937]
Wages recalled that he had FBI Supervisory Special Agent James Cadigan from the FBI Laboratory photograph the bullet. Later Wages realized that he needed to obtain a letter designation from the photographer and then have a new picture taken with the letter designation. [FN938] However, Wages was not able to find a photographer. Thereafter, Wages was instructed to end the search and return to the command post for a briefing. The photographer, Kelly Kramer, was still unavailable to assign letter designations to the bullet and to photograph them. before leaving the Y area, wages picked up the L-1 bullet, marked it, and placed it in a plastic envelope that he put in his pocket.
After assisting in the search of the Weaver cabin, Wages asked Special Agent Kramer to return with him to where the bullet had been found. Kramer was told to photograph the spot. [FN939] According to Wages, he did not tell case agent Rampton that he had removed the bullet from the scene and replaced it until Rampton asked about it in October or November 1992. [FN940]
On August 31, the Y crime scene was subjected to a theodolite test [FN941] by Visual Information Specialists Cyrus Grover and Michael Taister from the FBI Laboratory in Washington, D.C. Grover and Taister were present in connection with their responsibilities as members of the FBI's Shooting Incident Review Team. They employed a theodolite test to measure distances with a laser beam from a reference point to the location of each piece of evidence. Grover saw that many of the small red flags in the area had been knocked over. Using the theodolite system, Grover began to take measurements of some of the undisturbed flags and some of the evidence that had not been removed. [FN942] The measurements were recorded and later used to produce a computer-generated diagram of the crime scene, fixing locations where evidence had been found.
Upon his return to Washington, Grover began to prepare a sketch of the Y crime scene with appropriate orientation data. Before he had finished, he was injured during a vacation and went on extended sick leave. during Grover's absence, Taister faxed the working copy to the FBI's Salt Lake City office in the mistaken belief that it was complete and accurate. [FN943]
On December 22, 1992, Rampton discovered that the orientation of the diagram Grover and Taister had generated was inaccurate and that the location of much of the evidence recovered was not on the sketch. Upon inquiry, Rampton was told that the diagram was an inaccurate working copy. [FN944]
On December 22, 1992, Rampton discovered that the orientation of the diagram Grover and Taister had generated was inaccurate and that the location of much of the evidence recovered was not on the sketch. Upon inquiry, Rampton was told that the diagram was an inaccurate working copy. [FN944]
HRT member Lon Horiuchi showed Robert Dean the position on the mountainside from which he fired two shots on August 22. On August 31, Dean showed Horiuchi's position to James Cadigan, who was assigned to assist the Review Team's inquiry. [FN945] Grover and Taister, as part of the FBI's Shooting Incident Review Team, used the theodolite measuring system to obtain information for the investigation of the August 22 shots at the cabin area.
On September 1, Grover and Taister accompanied Cadigan to the mountainside. By this time, Horiuchi had left. Cadigan had difficulty finding the position that Dean had identified, but finally pointed to a position from which he believed Horiuchi had fired. [FN946]
The diagram was erroneous because Cadigan had not correctly identified Horiuchi's position at the time of the shots to Grover and Taister. [FN949] Furthermore, the theodolite measurements were based on the location of the birthing shed when the measurements were taken. However, the Hostage Rescue Team had moved the birthing shed during the standoff. [FN950]
After Weaver and his family had surrendered, the cabin was searched on August 31, September 1, and September 10, 1992. In preparation for the searches, two briefings were held to give assignments and to review procedures for handling evidence. [FN951] The first search was made immediately after the BATF declared the cabin safe to enter. The cabin was videotaped before and after the search. [FN952] Approximately ten agents were inside the cabin when the searches were conducted, with Rampton in charge. [FN953]
Each piece of evidence was identified by an evidence number and photographed with the evidence number. [FN954] An evidence log was maintained that included a description of each piece of seized evidence. Personnel inside the cabin wore gloves to preserved latent fingerprints. At the conclusion of the search, items seized were placed in a HUMMV vehicle for transportation to the base of the mountain. The evidence was then transferred from the HUMMV to a U-Haul truck under Rampton's supervision. The truck was padlocked, and the evidence was driven to Boise, Idaho for storage. [FN955]
Rampton initially instructed the agents to retrieve only a representative sampling of the ammunition inside the cabin. This instruction was countermanded by Howen and Special Agent in Charge Glenn. [FN956]
The searches of the areas surrounding the cabin were conducted by approximately twenty agents from the FBI and BATF and officers from local agencies. That group was broken down into four teams of two or three searchers. The teams worked in a counterclockwise direction, placing markers near objects that might have evidentiary value. After the area was searched, another group was responsible for photographing, sketching, logging, tagging, and seizing objects. [FN957]
During one of the searches of the around the cabin, Howen found a blue spiral notebook in the birthing shed, which contained swastikas. "Arise on White Man" poems, and right wing statements and quotations. [FN958] Howen complained that the notebook was not available during his preparation for trial because it had not been seized. [FN959]
On Sunday, August 30, Jackie Brown, a friend of the Weaver family, assisted Bo Gritz in carrying the body of Vicki Weaver out of the cabin. After taking the body to a helicopter, Brown returned to the forward command post. She approached a group of six to eight law enforcement officials and requested water and towels to clean the cabin. She was handed two five-gallon buckets, three white bath towels, and a roll of paper towels. She remembers that HRT Commander Richard Rogers was among the group. [FN960]
FBI negotiator Lanceley remembers that he was in the forward command post when Brown came down the hill to get water. He saw once HRT member assist her in taking the water part way up. Lanceley remembers that Special Agent in Charge Robin Montgomery saw Brown with the water and told Lanceley to stop her. Lanceley ran out of the command post and yelled to Brown who had rounded the bend at the top of the hill and was approaching the cabin. She did not stop. According to Lanceley, Montgomery was not consulted before the water was given to Brown. [FN961]
When Brown returned to the Weaver cabin, she cleaned Vicki Weaver's blood from the floor because she did not want the Weaver daughters to "deal with cleaning the blood of their mother from the floor," since they "had been through enough." [FN962] Brown gathered the blood soaked towels from the cabin and threw them off the rear deck.
The searches of the area near the Weaver residence, including the Y, coordinated by the FBI, have been criticized as disorganized, confused, and unsecured. Much of the criticism noted that too many people were involved in the searches, creating confusion, and that access to the crime scenes was not sufficiently restricted. [FN963] It was also apparent to some who conducted the searches that many agents who participated were inexperienced in crime scene search techniques and had not been trained for this assignment. [FN964]
These allegations have some merit. The use of metal detectors by untrained FBI agents and other personnel at the crime scene resulted in incomplete searches. [FN965] For example, a private metal detection expert, Richard Graham, searched the Y in March 1993 and located the butt plate of Sammy Weaver's rifle. This search was conducted approximately six months after the FBI searches and with snow on the ground. We believe that the inexperience of the agents who used the metal detectors in the initial searches and the apparent lack of organization contributed to the failure to locate this and perhaps other pieces of evidence.
If agents with expertise in the use of metal detectors had been on the scene at the initial searches, the butt plate of Sammy Weaver's rifle may have been discovered much earlier. Other valuable evidence which could have been utilized by the prosecution in formulating the charges may have been lost because of the use of agents inexperienced in metal detection.
Because Agent Thundercloud's diagram of the location of evidence and the other techniques the FBI employed were based on only one fixed reference point -- a tree stump -- locations could not be noted with precision. [FN966] To provide a second point of reference, Venkus would note that pieces of evidence were found, near some other point or near another piece of evidence. Compass headings were not utilized to memorialize the location of evidence, and an accurate record was not made of the elevations where evidence was located. [FN967]
In our view, these techniques lacked the precision required for a crime scene search of this importance. As Lindquist noted, the FBI's methods allowed one to locate a piece of evidence "fairly close" to where it had been found, but "fairly close" was not sufficient for trial, in which, for example, the location of Degan's casings became "very critical." [FN968]
Although the FBI explained that triangulation could not be utilized in the crime scene investigation because of uneven terrain, it was unprofessional not to use triangulation in such an important case. Triangulation is an established method of accurately locating significant pieces of evidence and is utilized in most homicide investigations. As noted earlier, the accurate location of the shell casings from Degan's rifle was significant. The exact placement of those shells using triangulation would have assisted in determining the credibility of Deputy Marshal Cooper in his account of Degan's actions with his weapon during the shootout.
If agents with expertise in the use of metal detectors had been on the scene at the initial searches, the butt plate of Sammy Weaver's rifle may have been discovered much earlier. Other valuable evidence which could have been utilized by the prosecution in formulating the charges may have been lost because of the use of agents inexperienced in metal detection.
b. Techniques Used to Record the Location of Evidence
Because Agent Thundercloud's diagram of the location of evidence and the other techniques the FBI employed were based on only one fixed reference point -- a tree stump -- locations could not be noted with precision. [FN966] To provide a second point of reference, Venkus would note that pieces of evidence were found, near some other point or near another piece of evidence. Compass headings were not utilized to memorialize the location of evidence, and an accurate record was not made of the elevations where evidence was located. [FN967]
In our view, these techniques lacked the precision required for a crime scene search of this importance. As Lindquist noted, the FBI's methods allowed one to locate a piece of evidence "fairly close" to where it had been found, but "fairly close" was not sufficient for trial, in which, for example, the location of Degan's casings became "very critical." [FN968]
Although the FBI explained that triangulation could not be utilized in the crime scene investigation because of uneven terrain, it was unprofessional not to use triangulation in such an important case. Triangulation is an established method of accurately locating significant pieces of evidence and is utilized in most homicide investigations. As noted earlier, the accurate location of the shell casings from Degan's rifle was significant. The exact placement of those shells using triangulation would have assisted in determining the credibility of Deputy Marshal Cooper in his account of Degan's actions with his weapon during the shootout.
We agree with the trial team that triangulation or some other scientifically precise method should have been used in an investigation of such importance.
The events surrounding the discovery and retrieval of the "magic bullet" generated allegations of staged or manipulated evidence. [FN969] We have not found evidence of intentional concealment, staging, or a lack of a good faith on the part of the FBI or the other law enforcement agencies that assisted in the searches. However, we believe that poor judgment by those who conducted the crime scene searches created confusion and, as manifested by the "magic bullet" episode, that poor judgment harmed the government's case.
The inability of the FBI to have a photographer available at all times during the crime scene investigation is difficult to understand. At such a critical stage of the investigation, a photographer should have been available to photograph and properly designate all evidence as it was originally discovered. Such an important case demanded the proper identification of evidence in order to alleviate any questions of admissibility.
Lindquist believed that the testimony of an FBI agent about the bullet's removal from and replacement at the crime scene left the jury with the impression that the agent was not being genuine: the jury must have concluded that "[e]ither [the agent's] deceitful or he's so incompetent that I can't rely upon [his testimony]." [FN970] Lindquist believed that the episode contributed to a taint that spread across the government's case, which made it impossible for the jury to trust what the government was saying. That lack of trust was a "big part of the trial." [FN971]
In our view, the erroneous diagram is attributable to Dean's failure to mark the position when Horiuchi identified the spot from which he had fired. Furthermore, had Grover and Taister been more thoroughly briefed on events during the standoff, they would have known that the outbuildings had been moved.
The lack of precision in preparing the shooting position diagrams could have had a serious effect on the government's trial preparation and could have been admitted as demonstrative evidence during trial if the mistake had not been detected. Although the mistake was discovered before trial, the prosecution was concerned that the diagrams constituted exculpatory material that could have had a critical impact at trial. [FN972]
The investigators who were sent out to take the measurements and prepare diagrams of the crime scene did not have a sufficient understanding of the facts and circumstances. Surely, in such an important investigation, it was necessary for these agents to have a thorough knowledge of the events, possibly based on briefings from participants themselves. The FBI should have had complete and accurate briefings for agents conducting the Shooting Incident Review. The unavailability of one of the Visual Information Specialists during a crucial stage led to further confusion and further inaccuracy. This demonstrates a lack of overall planning and coordination in conducting such investigations.
In our view, this error should have not occurred. The precision essential for crime scene searches and evaluations was inexcusably lacking in this investigation. The mix-up in sending the "working" diagram could have been avoided had communications been better and had more professional procedures been in place.
Jackie Brown's actions have been criticized as contaminating the crime scene. Technically, that is correct. However, her efforts may have served a more important purpose in contributing toward the resolution of the crisis.
It is unclear whether the FBI command structure considered the significance of Brown's actions. Montgomery did not know whether Brown's actions were authorized or whether they were spontaneous. He affirmed that we was not consulted before Brown obtained the water and that he was not in a position to delay her while her plans were assessed. [FN973]
We have not been able to determine whether anyone weighed the likely negative impact of contamination of the crime scene against the potentially positive impact Brown's actions might have in resolving the crisis. In our view, the fact that Brown was able to return to the cabin with water and paraphernalia without the approval of Montgomery, the FBI's ranking supervisor at the forward command post, shows that the command and control of the situation was less than perfect. Nevertheless, in retrospect we believe that the decision to allow Brown to clean the cabin, however it was reached, was proper.
Those involved in the crime scene searches at Ruby Ridge have assessed those searches very differently. Those who planned and supervised the searches generally gave them high marks. [FN974] Other law enforcement personnel who participated in or became familiar with the searches were highly critical. The criticism came from FBI personnel, as well as others.
In our view, three factors contributed significantly to the difficulty of conducting the crime scene searches. First, the searches were conducted during an ongoing effort to resolve the crisis. Second, an unusually large number of law enforcement personnel from a wide variety of federal, state, and local law enforcement components were at the site, adding to the confusion and congestion. Third, the terrain was extremely rough, uneven, and covered with dense foliage.
Many of the deficiencies of the crime scene searches are attributable to one or more of those factors. However, in our view, other shortcomings probably could have been avoided, for example, the failure to cordon off the search ares at the conclusion of a search, the inexperience of those who operated metal detectors that resulted in the failure to discover at least one important piece of evidence, the "magic bullet" episode, the lack of precision in measuring the location of discovered evidence, and the failure to understand the possible negative impact of Brown's actions.
Many of the problems that attended the crime-scene searches could have been avoided had an experienced evidence-recovery team been summoned. We disagree with Glenn's characterization of Ruby Ridge as a "normal murder crime scene." The use of the Evidence Response Team would certainly have added badly needed experience and expertise to the investigation and may very well have alleviated a number of the problems that we discuss here. The Ruby Ridge crime scene investigation was difficult. Those who conducted the search had participated in the tiring, tension filled operation that ultimately resolved the standoff. As a consequence, some aspects of the crime-scene search were confused and incomplete. The utilization of sophisticated, professional, evidence location, retrieval, identification, and preservation techniques in this case was necessary.
Released through
LEXIS COUNSEL CONNECT
LEXIS COUNSEL CONNECT is a communications and information service for attorneys. LCC is managed by American Lawyer Media, L.P.
914 SIOC Log, August 22, 1992, at 5:20 p.m. (EDT).
915 Sworn Statement of Eugene Glenn, January 12, 1994, at 30.
916 FD-302 Interview of Lucien Haag, October 12, 1993, at 2.
917 Id.; FD-302 Interview of Richard Graham, October 13, 1993, at 2; FD-302 Interview of Gregory Rampton, October 18 & 19, 1993, at 44.
918 Local police had arrested armed individuals attempting to reach the Weaver cabin.
919 FD-302 Interview of Michael Dillon, October 25, 1993, at 4.
920 Rampton FD-302, October 18 & 19, 1993, at 6.
921 FD-302 Interview of Larry Wages, October 13 & 15, 1993, at 3; Rampton FD-302, at 5.
922 FD-302 Interview of Joseph Venkus, October 18 & 19, 1992, at 5-6.
923 Id. at 6.
924 Only one of the deputy sheriffs was familiar with the equipment. FD-302 Interview of Donald Magee, October 4, 1993, at 1-2; FD-302 Interview of Carl Shepherd, October 5, 1993, at 2.
925 For example, the first item of evidence photographed on the first role of film was designated "A-1."
926 Venkus FD-302, at 5-6.
927 Wages FD-302, at 5. On Thursday, August 27, agents videotaped the Y crime scene and the fern field, the area near the Y where the marshals' observation team had received fire while moving from their position to the spot where Deputy Marshal Degan had been killed. Following the August 24 search, Venkus was occupied with drying out the evidence that had been retrieved. Venkus FD-302, at 7.
928 Venkus FD-302, at 7. On August 29, Wages supervised a grid search of another portion of the Y crime scene. The same procedure was followed as had been utilized the day before. No evidence was found during this search. Wages FD-302, at 4-5.
929 Rampton FD-302, at 4-5.
930 Venkus FD-302, at 5-6; Wages FD-302, at 4.
931 Rampton FD-302, at 11.
932 Venkus FD-302, at 8.. 933 Wages FD-302, at 5.
934 Howen Interview, Tape 6, at 13-14.
935 Lindquist Interview, Tape 3, at 16.
936 Wages FD-302, at 5.
937 During the search, four additional brass/bullets were discovered and designated L-2 through L-5. Id. at 5-7.
938 See discussion in Section IV(O).
939 FD-302 Interview of Kelly Kramer, October 12, 1993, at 2. Wages also asked FBI Visual Information Specialist Grover to photograph a spent round of ammunition in place. Grover was not told that the evidence had been removed from and returned to the location. FD-302 Interview of Cyrus Grover, August 6, 1993, at 2.
940 Wages FD-302, at 6-7. However, Rampton told investigators that when Wages arrived at the command post he showed him the bullet. Rampton FD-302, at 6-7.
941 The theodolite system is a laser surveying instrument, which pinpoints locations in relation to a reference point.
942 Grover FD-302, at 2.
943 Id. at 3; Taister FD-302, at 4.
944 Rampton FD-302, at 11.
945 FD-302 Interview of James Cadigan, August 10, 1993, at 4.
946 Taister FD-302, at 3; Grover FD-302, at 3; Cadigan FD- 302, at 5.
947 Lindquist Interview, Tape 3, at 11-12. Lindquist was convinced that the diagram was wrong because Horiuchi consistently identified a different location as his position when he took the shots. Id. at 13-15.
948 Id. at 13-14.
949 Cadigan has said that he should have placed a stake or some other marker at the spot Dean had shown him. Cadigan FD- 302, at 5.
950 Lindquist Interview, Tape 2, at 11-13.
951 FD-302 Interview of George Sinclair, October 7, 1993, at 3.
952 Rampton FD-302, at 8.
953 Grover FD-302, at 3.
954 Special Agent Curtis Kastens of the Idaho State Bureau of Investigation was assigned to the search as a photographer because the team responsible for the grounds around the Weaver cabin did not have a photographer. FD-302 Interview of Curtis Kastens, October 5 & 22, 1993, at 1.
955 Rampton FD-302, at 8.
956 Id. at 9. Only a representative sampling of the casings found outside the rear of the cabin was taken into evidence. Because the front of the cabin and the rocky outcropping were seen as more important to the investigation, all cartridge casings found in those areas were seized. FD-302 Interview of George Sinclair, October 7, 1993, at 4. According to Sinclair, Howen did not object to taking only a sample of the casings from outside the rear of the cabin. Id.
957 Sinclair FD-302, at 3.
958 Howen Interview, Tape 11, at 30-31.
959 On September 9, 1992, Dillon told FBI Special Agent Richard Powell to retrieve a blue spiral notebook and submitted it to the secure evidence storage area. FD-302 Interview of Richard Powell, October 8, 1993, at 3. We have been unable to determine why the notebook was unavailable for trial preparation.
960 FD-302 Interview of Jackie Brown, October 5, 1993, at 3.
961 FD-302 Interview of Frederick Lanceley, October 19, 1993, at 5.
962 Jackie Brown FD-302, at 3.
963 See, e.g., Grover FD-302, at 1-2; FD-302 Interview of Michael Taister, August 6, 1993, at 3; Lindquist Interview, Tape 3, at 15; FD-302 Interview of Curtis Kastens, October 5 & 22, 1993, at 2.
After the Y had been searched on August 24 and 28, the area was not cordoned off because it was thought that additional searches would not be necessary. Wages FD-302, at 4.
964 FD-302 Interview of Greg Sprungl, August 30, 1993, at 3.
965 The FBI used three metal detectors during the initial searches at the Y. Two were rented and appeared to be "well used." The rented detectors were not as sensitive as the third. FBI Special Agent David Barker operated the third detector, but had no experience in using a metal detector. Apparently, none of the operators of metal detectors at the initial searches were experienced. FD-302 Interview of David Barker, October 12, 1993, at 1-2.
According to Lucien Haag, the use of metal detection equipment is a skill that "needs to be continuously honed." He recommended that agents be taught how to operate detector equipment effectively. FD-302 Interview of Lucien Haag, October 12, 1993, at 3.
966 For example, if a bullet casing had been found 10 feet from the stump, Thundercloud's diagram would not reveal the precise location of the casing along an arc twenty feet from the stump.
967 Special Agent Curtis Kastens of the Idaho Bureau of Investigation participated in the searches. He thought that the searches at the Y wee not handled appropriately for a murder investigation and that some form of reconstruction, including "to-scale elevations," should have been attempted. Kastens also thought that more time should have been allowed for accurate measurements. Kastens FD-302, at 3.
968 Lindquist Interview, Tape 3, at 17. During Thundercloud's cross examination, the defense was very critical of the failure to utilize triangulation or compass headings. The issue consumed an entire afternoon. However, Lindquist does not believe that the jury considered the matter to be a major issue. Id at 10.
966 For example, if a bullet casing had been found 10 feet from the stump, Thundercloud's diagram would not reveal the precise location of the casing along an arc twenty feet from the stump.
967 Special Agent Curtis Kastens of the Idaho Bureau of Investigation participated in the searches. He thought that the searches at the Y wee not handled appropriately for a murder investigation and that some form of reconstruction, including "to-scale elevations," should have been attempted. Kastens also thought that more time should have been allowed for accurate measurements. Kastens FD-302, at 3.
968 Lindquist Interview, Tape 3, at 17. During Thundercloud's cross examination, the defense was very critical of the failure to utilize triangulation or compass headings. The issue consumed an entire afternoon. However, Lindquist does not believe that the jury considered the matter to be a major issue. Id at 10.
969 For a discussion of the controversy at trial involving photographs of this bullet see Section IV(O).
970 Id. at 26-27.
971 Id. at 27.
972 Id. at 12.
973 Sworn Statement of Robin Montgomery, October 25, 1993, at 3 .
976 Wages described the first search of the Y on August 24 as "well-organized." Wages FD-302, at 4. Dillon said that the search was conducted in a "very professional and methodical manner." Dillon FD-302, at 4. Venkus declared that, "given the circumstances and conditions that existed, an excellent job had been conducted by all who participated." Venkus, FD-302, at 7.
Released through
LEXIS COUNSEL CONNECT
LEXIS COUNSEL CONNECT is a communications and information service for attorneys. LCC is managed by American Lawyer Media, L.P.