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J. The FBI Laboratory

1. Introduction

The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Idaho ("USAO"), components of the FBI, the U.S. Marshals Service, local law enforcement agencies, and the trial court all criticized the performance of the FBI Laboratory ("Laboratory") during the course of the Weaver trial. In this section, we will examine the timeliness and quality of the Laboratory's response to requests for tests, its refusal to perform certain tests, and its neglect to do others.

2. Statement of Facts

a. FBI Laboratory Processing Procedure

Special Agents Gregory Rampton and Joseph Venkus, the FBI case agents for the Weaver/Harris prosecution, coordinated the submission of evidence to the FBI Laboratory for examination. They were responsible for disseminating the results of the examinations to the U.S. Attorney's Office in Boise. Assistant U.S. Attorney Lindquist was primarily responsible for Laboratory related issues for the prosecution.

It is FBI policy that when the Laboratory receives a request from a field office to examine evidence, a principal examiner is assigned to the matter. The examiner assigns a priority to the request. Cases for which the FBI is primarily responsible are given the highest priority, followed by cases involving violent crimes, cases involving crimes against property, and cases in which a judicial proceeding is unlikely. In practice, we found that pendency of a trial date is the overriding factor determining whether a case becomes a priority.

The principal examiner forwards items of evidence to the appropriate unit within the Laboratory, prepares a report when the examination has been completed, and returns the items to the field office with the report.

The principal examiner in the weaver matter was Supervisory Special Agent James Cadigan of the Firearms/Toolmarks Unit. Cadigan directed the requests for examinations from the field to various Laboratory components; formalized the final reports; and oversaw the return of evidence. One hundred and ninety nine pieces of evidence were submitted to the Laboratory for 350 examinations. Cadigan conveyed the results of the examinations to Venkus or Rampton by telephone, who would send a written report by facsimile to the USAO. When the agents received the final, written Laboratory reports, they would also send them to the USAO. The Laboratory generated twelve reports in the Weaver matter.

b. Timeliness and Neglected Tests

On January 8, 1993, a conference was held in the chambers of U.S. District Court Judge Lodge. The defense requested that the trial date of February 2, 1993 be postponed because of the volume of information and documents to be reviewed and because not all of the Laboratory examinations had been completed. Judge Lodge admonished the government to provide the results of the examinations quickly. Assistant U.S. Attorney Howen told the court that he was attempting to comply with the court's instructions, but that he had no control over the delay caused by the FBI Laboratory. [FN975]

Following Weaver's sentencing, Judge Lodge issued a contempt order against the FBI and levied a fine because the prosecution had "receiv[ed] less than full cooperation from the FBI" and the Bureau had not produced items of evidence "timely." [FN976] The court referred to the FBI's "recalcitrance" and held that he Bureau had "evidence[d] a callous disregard for the rights of the defendants and the interests of justice and demonstrate[d] a complete lack of respect for the order and directions of [the] court." [FN977]

This inquiry had determined that, by January 8, 1993, the date of the chambers conference, the FBI Laboratory had completed four reports. [FN978] After the conference, the Laboratory submitted reports on January 8, January 13, January 21, January 22, February 25, March 17, April 12, and April 13. The 44 items analyzed in those reports were submitted to the Laboratory between August 28 and November 27, 1992. [FN979] The majority of tests outstanding on January 8 were serology tests and hair, fiber, and DNA tests of pieces of clothing. The FBI received Vicki and Sammy Weaver's hair and blood samples on January 5 and 29, 1993. Deputy Marshal Degan's blood samples were prematurely returned to the Seattle field office where they were allowed to spoil. Most of the test results on the Weaver blood samples were included in the January Laboratory reports.

After the chambers conference, the FBI Laboratory received eight requests for examinations in the Weaver matter, which were completed according to the following schedule:

Date of Communication - Date of Response

January 11, 1993 - February 25, 1993

January 20, 1993 - March 17, 1993

January 28, 1993 - February 25, 1993

February 11, 1993 - February 25, 1993

March 21, 1993 - April 12, 1993

April 2, 1993 - April 13, 1993

April 9, 1993 - April 13, 1993

May 26, 1993 - June 7, 1993


The first examination that appears to have been neglected was a request on August 27, 1992 to determine whether two pieces of metal were once part of Degan's canteen clip. The second neglected examination was a request on September 9 to compare blood samples of Vicki and Sammy Weaver with blood found on tow jackets and a pair of pants. [FN981] The third was a request on October 28 to determine whether holes in Degan's backpack and the clothing it contained had been caused by a bullet. [FN982]

There was no response to these requests in the Laboratory report of December 23, 1992. The field office again requested these examinations on January 5, 1993. The Laboratory responded on January 22. A more detailed discussion of these tests follows.

(1) Degan's Backpack

Cadigan told our inquiry that he does not know why the examination of the backpack and its contents was overlooked. The report on the backpack notes that an "exit" hole in the backpack and holes in the clothing inside had a "linear relationship" and could have been caused by a bullet or bullet fragments. The report states that no other determinations or conclusions could be made. [FN983]

During the trial, a defense attorney found another hole in a fold of the backpack. [FN984] We asked Cadigan whether he had attempted to locate all entrance and exit holes in Degan's backpack. He replied that he had examined the backpack closely and did not discover any damage, other than that noted in his reports. [FN985]

(2) Blood and Hair Examinations

After being retrieved from Ruby Ridge, Deputy Marshal Degan's body was taken to a morgue for an autopsy, which was performed on August 22, 1992 by Dr. George Lindholm. FBI Special Agent John attended the autopsy, along with representatives of the U.S. Marshals Service, the Boundary County Sheriff's Office, and the Boundary County Coroner's Office. A photographic record and log of the autopsy was kept, and John retained several items of evidence, including hair samples and two tubes of blood, which were sent to the Laboratory on August 14 for "whatever analysis you deem appropriate."

The Laboratory received the evidence on August 25, 1992. Within two days, Cadigan performed the obvious tests on the bullet fragments which had been removed from Degan's body and provided the preliminary results to SIOC for transmission to the crisis site. Cadigan sent the final results to the Seattle field office which had sent the material. Because no specific requests had been made as to the blood and hair samples, Cadigan asked the field office to specify the tests that should be conducted. The field office was unsure about the tests needed and explained that the material had been sent just to "cover all the bases." [FN986]

In September, 1992, the Laboratory received Harris and Randy Weaver's blood samples. Because the Laboratory had "insufficient space to maintain items of evidence," they were returned to the field office. [FN987] The items were placed in a bulky exhibit, and the blood spoiled because it was not refrigerated.

The FBI Hostage Rescue Team discovered Sammy Weaver's body, while clearing the birthing shed near the Weaver cabin on August 23, 1992. Dr. Lindholm conducted an autopsy on August 25. Special Agent John attended, along with representatives of the Boundary County Sheriff and Coroner's Offices. At the time, the circumstances surrounding Sammy Weaver's death were unknown, and the Sheriff's Office was proceeding on the assumption that the death was a homicide. Consequently, the office took samples of all the evidence from the autopsy, including blood and hair samples, for the Idaho State Crime Laboratory. [FN988]

On August 31, 1992, Dr. Lindholm conducted an autopsy of Vicki Weaver's body, attended by John and representatives of the U.S. Marshals Service, the Boundary County Sheriff's Office, and the Boundary County Coroner. The FBI retained several items, including hair samples, as evidence, but there is no indication that a blood sample was retained. [FN989] On September 3, the evidence was sent to the FBI Laboratory. [FN990]

Dr. Lindholm's autopsy reports for Degan and Sammy and Vicki Weaver show that body fluids and tissue, including purge fluid and blood and hair samples, were taken during each autopsy. As standard procedure, Dr. Lindholm provided blood and hair samples to the investigating agency. [FN991]

On September 3, 1992, the FBI Laboratory was asked to examine certain clothing to see whether blood and hair could be identified as that of Randy Weaver, Kevin Harris, Vicki Weaver, or Sammy Weaver. [FN992] Cadigan submitted the clothing for hair and fiber tests. These tests were completed on October 2.

When Rampton reviewed the December 23, 1992 Laboratory report, he discovered that blood and hair examinations had not been performed. The Laboratory told him that blood samples for Degan, Vicki Weaver, and Sammy Weaver and Harris' hair sample had not been sent to the Laboratory. [FN993]

On January 4, 1993, blood samples taken from Degan, Sammy Weaver and Vicki Weaver were obtained from Dr. Lindholm and sent to the Laboratory. [FN994] The examinations were completed and reported on January 21. On January 28, pursuant to a court order, samples of Harris' hair were taken and forwarded to the FBI Laboratory.

When the FBI Laboratory received a request for additional blood and hair comparisons on January 5, 1993, Cadigan realized that the FBI did not have the blood samples. The samples were submitted on January 6. [FN995] The examinations were completed and provided to the USAO on January 15 and given to the defense on January 27.

c. Refusal to Perform Tests and Hiring of Independent Experts

In one instance, the Laboratory refused to conduct a requested examination and, in several instance, the Laboratory determined that certain examinations were not possible.

During trial preparation, the USAO entered into contracts with three forensic specialists: Lucien Haag, a "shooting reconstructionist," Richard Graham a metal detection expert, and Dr. Marin Fackler, a wound ballistician. According to the prosecutors, these people were retained because the FBI Laboratory was unwilling or unable to provide assistance in their areas of expertise. [FN996]

(1) Refusal to Conduct Test

On March 21, 1993, the Laboratory was asked to determine the caliber of the bullet which passed through Sammy Weaver's jacket causing the fatal wound. The Laboratory may, at the examiner's discretion, refuse to conduct an examination if the examination and result have no basis in scientific theory, thereby precluding the examiner from testifying as to the result. Cadigan has asserted that no test recognized by forensic science enables an examiner to determine with any certainty the caliber of the bullet which caused a hole in clothing because there are too many variables and the exact anatomical position of the victim cannot be determined. For this reason, Cadigan refused to conduct the examination. When the Laboratory received another request to determine the caliber of the bullet that had struck Sammy Weaver, the Laboratory did conduct tests, but could not "definitely state exactly what caliber bullet went through the coat." [FN997]

(2) Shooting Reconstruction

Early in the trial preparation, Lindquist told the FBI case agents that the case needed an expert to reconstruct the shooting events at the Y on August 21 to corroborate the marshals' testimony. The agents replied that "there's no such thing." Lindquist explained that a shooting reconstructionist, on the basis of the physical evidence, can determine, among other things, the "directionality" of a bullet's trajectory. [FN995]

After some discussion, case agent Venkus called the FBI Laboratory and was told that the Laboratory does not do shooting reconstructions. With a sense of exasperation, Lindquist asked one of the deputy marshals assigned to the case to find one of the best shooting reconstructionists in the country and, within 24 hours, he was given Lucien Haag's name. When they spoke, Haag asked Lindquist why he was not using the FBI Laboratory because Haag had worked previously with someone in the Laboratory on a reconstruction.

Confused by the conflicting information he had received, Lindquist called Cadigan and was told that the Laboratory did do shooting reconstruction and that he was the FBI's expert in the area. Cadigan asked why a private expert was needed. Lindquist told Cadigan that he would continue with the private expert, though he would appreciate the FBI's cooperation. Lindquist accepted Cadigan's request to accompany the prosecutors when they visited the crime scene in March 1993. [FN999]

According to Lindquist, Cadigan seemed enthusiastic about participating in the case. Lindquist found Cadigan very helpful from that point forward, although he appeared far less knowledgeable than the private expert. [FN1000]

Rampton recalled Lindquist's request for a shooting reconstructionist and telling Lindquist that the Laboratory did not have shooting reconstruction as a single discipline. Rampton told Lindquist that he would check with the Laboratory. He spoke with Cadigan, who confirmed that the Laboratory did not have shooting reconstruction as a single discipline. Rampton claims he informed Lindquist of this and heard nothing more until Haag had been retained. [FN1001]

Cadigan recalls a phone call from a case agent about whether the FBI had a shooting reconstructionist. Cadigan told the agent that no single person could testify about every aspect of the reconstruction. Cadigan confirmed this within the Laboratory and informed the case agent that a shooting was usually reconstructed within a confined space such as a building so that impact points could be located and angles established. Although the shooting at the Y would be more difficult to reconstruct, Cadigan said that the Laboratory would do what it could and that the agent should advise the Laboratory if the prosecution wanted a reconstruction. Cadigan heard nothing more on the matter. [FN1002]

Lindquist does not recall Cadigan's explaining that the FBI Laboratory has a multi-disciplinary approach to shooting reconstruction or that no one person would be able to testify about the many examinations. [FN1003]

(3) Wound Ballistics and Metal Detection

During this inquiry, we found no requests by the USAO for FBI experts in metal detection or wound ballistics. Metal detection experts are available within the FBI's Information Services Division. Although the FBI Laboratory does not have a wound ballistics expert, it consults with experts at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, and this expertise would have been available on request.

(4) Acoustic Testing

Initially the prosecution believed that evidence of the acoustics of the shooting scene on August 21, 1992 would be valuable. The prosecutors were referred to an FBI acoustics expert to evaluate this aspect of the case. Lindquist was disappointed with the FBI's expertise in the field. [FN1004] The prosecution did attempt an acoustics test in the area of the Weaver cabin with the assistance of two marshal and ultimately concluded that such a test would not be productive.

d. Failure to Comply with Discovery

The final issue raised by Judge Lodge about the FBI Laboratory concerns the mailing of notes and test firings of the weapons. The defense orally requested production of Cadigan's notes and the test firings at the end of the first week or the beginning of the second week in May 1992.

Cadigan recalled receiving a call, possibly on Monday, May 10, 1993, from Venkus advising him that the court intended to order production of his notes and the test firings. Cadigan received "the distinct direction" from Venkus to wait until a court order had been issued before sending test samples and notes. [FN1005] He sought advice on the matter from the FBI's Legal Counsel Division, which suggested to the USAO reasons why the notes and the test firings should not be given to the defense. [FN1006]

On Thursday, May 13, Cadigan received an angry call from Special Agent Dillon asking where the test firings were. Cadigan explained that he was waiting for a court order. Dillon told Cadigan to send the notes and test firings to Boise immediately. Because Cadigan did not wish to "cause the Agents a problem," he facsimiled his notes to Boise. The facsimile was poor, and Cadigan express-mailed the notes and test firings to Boise, securing the envelope flaps with tape before placing them into a box for shipment.

The following day, Friday, Cadigan was informed that three of the envelopes had opened during shipment and that the contents had spilled out and had become commingled. He instructed the caller to express-mail the test firings to the Laboratory where he could rectify the problem by examining microscopic markings. The test firings arrived on May 17, 1993. Cadigan immediately placed them in the appropriate envelopes and sent the test firings. by express-mail to Boise. [FN1007] The prosecution advised the Court that the test firings available for defense review on May 18. According to Dillon, this delayed the trial and produced additional discovery problems.

3. Discussion

In analyzing the performance of the FBI Laboratory, we interviewed field and Laboratory personnel; analyzed field communications requesting examinations and transmitting physical evidence; audited Laboratory reports and tracking of examined articles; assessed criticisms by agencies and interested parties; inspected the crime scenes; and reviewed grand jury testimony, court proceedings, and autopsy reports.

a. Problems with Delays in Test Results

Our investigation revealed that Judge Lodge, as well as the trial team, the FBI field agents, and their supervisors were not satisfied with the response of the FBI Laboratory in this case. [FN1008] In exploring the delays in conducting and reporting examinations, we discovered a lack of coordination, communication, and cooperation within the FBI. Unfortunately, these delays had significant impact on the government's discovery obligations and the way the government was perceived by the court and at trial.

Perhaps every prosecution team thinks that its case is most important and that the Laboratory should respond accordingly. In this case, we agree with the prosecutors that the Weaver prosecution was a most important case that should have been placed on an expedited and coordinated tracking system.

We question the wisdom of the FBI Laboratory's practice of using the trial date as the primary triggering criterion for Laboratory results. It is beyond dispute that a trial team needs test results well before the trial and, ideally, before they must be turned over to the defense. [FN1009]

We also question the practice of accumulating test results in a single report. Reporting test results as they are determined would enable problems to be detected and resolved earlier. The procedure would also permit additional tests to be requested and completed in a ore timely fashion. Our inquiry found that written notifications to the field beyond these collective reports were also late or non-existent. Although or inspectors were told that telephonic notifications were made on a regular basis, no documentation could be located. Consequently, we can make no specific determination of the number, date, or contents of telephonic notifications. The prosecutors said they received no Laboratory test results until the latter part of November or the first part of December about evidence they began to collect in August. [FN1010]

We find it unreasonable that tests requested in August and September were completed in December. We find the practice of sending samples back to the field because "specific instructions" are not contained in the request unreasonable and indicative of poor communication and coordination. [FN1011]

When Laboratory tests require additional evidence or specific instructions, communication with the most knowledgeable people, the case agents or the prosecutors, should be continuous. The delay caused by the lack of blood samples could have been prevented by coordination and effort. When Degan's blood samples were shipped with requests that were not "specific" enough for the Laboratory, it should have contacted the case agents to get specific advice. Instead, the Laboratory sent the blood to the transmitting office where it was allowed to spoil. Cadigan noted that the case agents did not "key on" the return of samples. [FN1012] We do not believe the responsibility for this delay lies wit the agents alone. The December discovery that the blood of Vicki Weaver and Sammy Weaver and Kevin Harris' hair samples had not been transmitted to the FBI Laboratory for tests requested in early September in another example of a lack of coordination.

Cadigan believed that the Laboratory received requests for examinations that fit the prosecutors' "theory of the week" and that the resulting tension between the prosecutors and the case agents adversely affected the coordination necessary between the field and the Laboratory for timely and effective processing of evidence. [FN1013]

One of the reasons the case agents give for the continued delays after Judge Lodge's Order was the burden placed on the Laboratory by unnecessary and unreasonable requests by the USAO. According to Rampton, the sole purpose of some requests was to avid the defense focusing on Degan's weapon, upon which the Laboratory had already completed and ejection pattern test. However, Lindquist told us that test firings of all weapons were necessary to locate where Degan and the others, including Harris and Sammy Weave, were during the shooting at the Y. Although he conceded that the test of Degan's weapon was more critical, Lindquist wanted to have all the weapons tested to show the jury that the government was not being selective in its testing. We find this explanation reasonable.

We are not convinced that the delays were the result of unnecessary requests by the prosecution team. Rather, we find a lack of initiative by the Laboratory in conducting examinations beyond the specific request. The use of private experts apparently renewed the Laboratory's interest in an commitment to the case. That was a costly and unnecessary expense. Our inquiry found that nothing done by the independent examiners fell outside the FBI's expertise.

In addition we find that the Laboratory's failure to respond in a timely manner contributed to the trial judge's perception that the government was not meeting its discovery obligations. Although the FBI Laboratory did much significant and professional work, the problems apparent in delays and lack of initiative should be remedied. If the primary cause for delays and failure to coordinate is the result of strained resources, priorities should be reevaluated. If the response in this matter is typical of high profile homicide cases involving the death of a federal law enforcement officer and two citizens, we wonder about the response to matters of less importance.

b. Failure to Provide Expertise and the Hiring of Independent Experts

Our investigation revealed a lack of cooperation and initiative by the Laboratory beyond specific tests requested. We found that the requisite expertise was present at the Laboratory, but it was something that the USAO had to discover. We share the prosecutors' disappointment in the Laboratory's lack of initiative or involvement in the case. We can empathize with the prosecutors who wanted to use the FBI for experts and receive the benefit of the Laboratory's suggestions in developing the prosecution theory. Although we cannot address the soundness of the examinations the private experts and prosecutors requested, many of the problems and the perception of incompetence could have been avoided by direct conversation between the prosecutors and the Laboratory.

Cadigan was aware that the idea for some tests, including the attempt to recreate the hole in Sammy Weaver's jacket, had originated with the private expert, and the case agents were frustrated that the prosecutors were going outside "normal investigative channels" by hiring experts to conduct "alternative examinations" that would not be done by the Laboratory. [FN1014] Cadigan believes that one of the main differences between the FBI Laboratory and private examiners is that the FBI Laboratory is "extremely conservative" and that FBI examiners will not testify to results not based on scientific fact because the Laboratory must maintain its reputation of being able to withstand cross examination. He believes that this distinguished FBI scientists from the majority of experts retained by defense counsel, whose primary purpose is to propose alternate theories to those advanced by the prosecution.

If the government's cases are to be presented successfully and fairly in the courtroom, the technical expertise of the FBI Laboratory must be available to assist trial teams beyond areas about which Laboratory experts can testify. For example, test firings of the weapons at the Y during the August 21 shooting were significant for planning the prosecution's theory and establishing trial strategy. The prosecutors and the rest of the trial team needed timely assistance from experts in interpreting evidence. Developing alternate theories of how events occurred is part of the investigative and trial preparation process. The scope of information that a prosecutor must develop should not be limited during trial preparation only to admissible tests and evidence.

An example of a test conducted by the independent examiner that the prosecution found helpful was an identification by elimination. The independent examiner did an analysis of cartridges found at the Y with weapons known to have been on the scene to exclude those that could not have been responsible for the cartridges. The FBI Laboratory expert viewed this form of identification as unscientific in that other unknown weapons may have been at the site. Nevertheless, the elimination of some weapons would assist the prosecutor in making decisions. It would also help at trial to know which weapons are capable of making a bullet hole associated with the fatal wound.

We believe a more coordinated, professional, creative, and cooperative approach to litigation and investigations would be far more helpful than the process we discovered in the Weaver matter.

c. Discovery Demand for Test Firings

and Laboratory Notes

Our investigation found that the delay in turning over Laboratory notes and test firings was one of several examples of the FBI resistance to, disagreement with, and misunderstanding of its discovery obligations in the Weaver case. We found the FBI's actions and decisions inappropriate. A court should not be compelled to order discovery compliance to resolve disputes between components of the government. Understandably, the delays caused by this attitude evoked a negative response from the court and counsel.

We found no evidence that the delays in the Laboratory tests were designed or intended to postpone the trial or obstruct justice. The decision to wait for an order was in conflict with the "open discovery" strategy of the USAO and the government's representations of cooperation in court. Objections to discovery should have been addressed to the court through the USAO. The accidental commingling of the materials sent to Idaho and the events that followed contributed to the court's perception that the FBI had no regard for the rights of the accused and for the administration of justice.

4. Conclusion

The lack of coordination and communication both within the FBI and with the USAO appears to be the major cause of the delays and the other problems examined in this section of the report.

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975 Transcript of proceedings in United States v. Randall C. Weaver and Kevin L. Harris, CR 92-080-N-EJL, on January 8, 1993.

976 Order, October 26, 1993, at 2.

977 Id. at 10, 13.

978 These reports were submitted on September 2, 1992, October 31, 1992, November 18, 1992, and December 23, 1992.

979 Items were also submitted on January 5, 1992.

980 On January 20, 1993, Lindquist sent Cooper and Roderick's weapons to the Laboratory and, on February 11, he sent Harris and Sammy Weaver's weapons for ejection pattern tests. The results of the test on Degan's weapon were reported on January 22.

On January 28, the Laboratory reported that the examinations requested on January 20 would take ten weeks to complete. They were actually completed on March 17. On February 9, the Laboratory reported that the examinations requested on January 28 would take ten weeks to complete. They were completed on February 25. On March 31, the Laboratory reported that the examinations requested on March 21 would take ten weeks to complete. They were completed on April 12. In our opinion, these inaccurate estimates show a lack of organization and probably made the prosecution less willing to request additional testing.

981 FD-302 Interview of James D. Cadigan, August 17, 1993, at 46-48.

982 Id. at 62.

983 Id. at 131.

984 The defense asserted that the two holes would be evidence that Degan received a shot to his back, spun around, and received a fatal shot from Cooper. This theory ignores the identification of Harris' bullet as the fatal shot to Degan's chest.

985 Cadigan FD-302, September 30, 1993, at 2.

986 Cadigan FD-302, August 10, 1993, at 7.

987 Cadigan FD-302, August 17, 1993, at 6.

988 FD-302 Interview of Jeffrey John, August 25, 1992. There is no indication in the field office that evidence from the autopsy of Sammy Weaver was sent to the FBI Laboratory. 989 Id.

990 The only evidence from the autopsy that was not sent to the FBI Laboratory were the fingerprint digits, which were examined by the local police department.

991 Dr. Lindholm told this inquiry that he was disappointed that the agents attending these autopsies were not knowledgeable about events surrounding the injuries. FD-302 Interview of Dr. George Lindholm, October 7, 1993, at 2.

992 Blood and hair samples were taken from Randy Weaver after he surrendered and were forwarded to the FBI Laboratory on September 1, 1992. Cadigan FD-302, August 17, 1993, at 25. There is no record of the Laboratory receiving blood samples of the Weaver group, other than Randy Weaver's. An FBI interview report erroneously stated that a sample of Harris's hair had been taken. After his surrender, Harris was taken to a hospital for treatment. According to a report prepared by FBI Special Agent James T. Davis, dated August 30, 1992, Davis took a blood sample from Harris at the hospital and Special Agent John took hair samples. The blood sample was forwarded to the FBI Laboratory on September 1, 1992. We understand that John did not obtain hair samples.

993 FD-302 Interview of Gregory Rampton, October 18-19, 1992, at 53.

994 FD-302 Interview of Mark Thundercloud, January 4, 1993.

995 Cadigan FD-302, August 17, 1993, at 76-86, 126.

996 Memorandum to Barbara Berman from Ronald D. Howen and Kim R. Lindquist, August 24, 1993.

997 Cadigan FD-302, August 10, 1993, at 13.

998 Lindquist Interview, Tape 2, at 38-39.

999 Lindquist Interview, Tape 2, at 40. Lindquist believes that these events were not the result of miscommunication and that the "image conscious FBI [attempted] to save face" after the U.S. Attorney's Office had retained a private expert. Memorandum from Ronald D. Howen and Kim Lindquist to Barbara Berman, August 24, 1993, at 4.

1000 Lindquist regretted having to spend $10,000 of taxpayers' dollars for something in which the FBI should have been expert and should have been willing to do. Id at 7.

1001 Rampton FD-302, October 18-19, 1993, at 46-47.

1002 Cadigan FD-302, September 30, 1993, at 1. Cadigan does not recall the events Lindquist described. He recalled that, in March 1993, a case agent told him that the prosecutors were going to Ruby ridge and asked whether he would be interested in accompanying them. Cadigan made arrangements to be there for two days. Cadigan said that the prosecutors never contacted him about the trip.

1003 Lindquist Interview, December 1, 1993, Tape 2, at 41.

1004 Memorandum from Ronald D. Howen and Kim R. Lindquist to Barbara Berman, August 24, 1993, at 7. Bruce Koenig, FBI Operational Support Unit, Information Resources Division, was prepared to render assistance, but Rampton or Lindquist told him to discontinue his work. FD-302 Interview of Bruce Koenig, October 28, 1993, at 2. See Section IV(N) of this report for additional discussion about this acoustical test.

1005 Cadigan FD-302, August 10, 1993, at 11.

1006 Id.

1007 Id.

1008 Both Glenn and Dillon expressed their disappointment in the Laboratory's performance. Sworn Statement of Eugene Glenn, January 12, 1994, at 31-33; FD-302 Interview of T. Michael Dillon, October 25, 1993, at 5.

1009 Although the Laboratory says that the trial date is important, FBI transmittal forms do not have a place for the date. The first record we found of a trial date was in a transmittal to the Engineering Section of the FBI Laboratory dated October 27, 1992. That entry reflects the trial date of February 2, 1993. Cadigan FD-302, August 17, 1993, at 58. Since the transmittal was sent to the Engineering Section in Quantico, Virginia, Cadigan never saw the transmittal. In fact, Cadigan

1009 (...continued) did not know the trial date until November or December. We find the principal examiner's ignorance of the data symptomatic of the poor coordination and communication in this case. We note that the case agents told our investigators that Cadigan must have been aware of the trial date because they referred to the date in their many conversations with him.

1010 Memorandum from Ronald D. Howen and Kim R. Lindquist to Barbara Berman, August 24, 1993.

1011 We also criticize the system in which the agent who collected the items is contacted when problems of this sort arise, instead of the case agent.

1012 Cadigan FD-302, August 10, 1993, at 7.

1013 Id. at 14.

1014 Cadigan FD-302, August 10, 1993, at 11.

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